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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH and 
MARGATET REEVES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs 
RAY WILLIS REEVES,-
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14511 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah appeals from an order against it on 
an Order to Show Cause in Re Temporary Support brought by the 
State of Utah and entered in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying the 
State of Utah full reimbursement for the total sum of assistance 
payments expended by the State. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court ordered that the Respondent had no 
duty to totally reimburse the State of Utah for public assistance 
payments made to Margaret B. Reeves without a prior order of the 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the District 
Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves, married Ray W. Reeves 
on or about August 16, 1974 (R. 1). Less than two months later 
Margaret and Ray Reeves separated, which separation occurred on 
or about October 14, 197 4. On December 18, 197 4, Margaret Reeves 
filed a Verified Complaint in which she sought a divorce from Ray 
Reeves. Margaret Reeves, in her complaint, waived her right to 
alimony and claimed the defendant to be the father of her then 
expected child (R. 1). In the answer of the defendant, Ray Reeves 
admitted that Margaret was not entitled to alimony and denied the 
paternity of the child of Margaret Reeves and any obligation of 
support that would follow thereafter (R.6). 
In January, 1975, Margaret Reeves began receiving public 
assistance payments and has received such payments through January, 
1976. An assignment of collection was executed on July 15, 1975, 
by which Margaret Reeves subrogated her rights to collection of 
any moneys expended by the State to the Department of Social 
Services (R. 12). After receiving notice in late August of 1975 
from the Department of Social Services that the Department was 
making public assistance payments to Margaret Reeves and her child, 
the defendant made a payment of $37.50 to the Department of 
Social Services (R. 17). Because of the financial position of 
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the defendant and the belief of the defendant that he was not 
the father of the child, the defendant paid only $37.50 to the 
State and protested the amounts which his estranged wife and 
alleged child were receiving. 
The State of Utah, rather than proceeding by administra-
tive action, attempted to seek reimbursement of the moneys which 
it had expended in support of Margaret Reeves and her child, by 
bringing an order to show cause in re temporary support and motion 
for judgment against the defendant on or about February 20, 1976, 
in the Third District Court. The State requested judgment for the 
total of $2,418.00, which moneys the State had paid in public 
assistance to Margaret Reeves and her child. 
The lower court took testimony as to the financial 
condition of the defendant and was made aware of the question of 
the paternity of the child in this matter; and after such testimony 
awarded the Utah State Department of Social Services the sum of 
$457.50 for unpaid support and denied the State judgment for 
assistance payments given the wife without a prior order of the 
court (R. 23-28). 
POINT 1 
THE STATE OF UTAH IS AN IMPROPER PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
Margarpt Reeves commenced a divorce action against Ray 
Reeves pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, §30-3-1 as amended. 
As such the only parties in interest are Ray Reeves and Margaret 
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Reeves. The State of Utah, in seeking reimbursement from Ray 
Reeves for payments paid by the State of Utah to Margaret Reeves 
in the form of public assistance payments, has attempted to join 
in that divorce proceeding by bringing an order to show cause in 
re temporary support; and also in that order attempted by motion 
to obtain a judgment against the Respondent for all sums paid by 
the State to or on behalf of Margaret Reeves. 
There is no statutory basis or common law basis for 
allowing the State of Utah to enter into a divorce action prior 
to a final decree to allow the State to seek reimbursement for 
moneys it has expended in public assistance payments to an 
individual. The State has, however, determined itself to be a 
real party in interest and brought the proceedings to obtain 
temporary support as well as reimbursement. Such an action is 
unwarranted and without precedent. 
As Justice Tuckett noted in his concurring opinion in 
Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (1976), when the Utah 
Department of Social Services intervened in an action after the 
Decree of Divorce had been entered: 
"I find no basis in law for such intervention. 
It goes without saying that the State could not 
have intervened in divorce proceedings filed by 
the plaintiff . . . there is no provision for 
expansion by any third person, and I find no legal 
basis for permitting the State to intervene after 
judgment." Id. at 241. 
The State has attempted to intervene in a divorce proceeding 
filed by the plaintiff. 
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There has been no Decree entered nor any orders 
entered prior to the proceedings brought by the State of Utah 
in this action. There may possibly be a right for the State to 
intervene after a decree of divorce has been entered into, as was 
the case in Bartholomew, supra. However, where there is not 
yet a decree of divorce, they have no right to intervene in the 
manner in which they did in the present case. The State of Utah 
could not intervene by right or by permissive intervention under 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 24 provides 
in part: 
" (a) Invervention of Right. Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene 
in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
representation of the applicant's interest by 
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the 
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated 
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or 
other disposition of property which is in the 
custody or subject to the control or disposition 
of the court or an officer thereof. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely 
application anyone may be permitted to intervene 
in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an 
applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common." 
There is no statutory right entitling the State to enter 
into a divorce action nor will the State be adversely affected by 
either an order for temporary support or a decree of divorce. The 
State is seeking a judgment against the Respondent which is an 
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action separate and apart from this divorce action. The State of 
Utah should proceed with a separate action against the defendant 
rather than clutter up the present divorce with the motions and 
proceedings which the State has brought in this case. 
In Baggs v. Anderson (Utah, 1974) 528 P.2d 141, a case 
involving a collection of child support payments, this Court held 
that when a person furnished support to a child, that person 
then has the right to collect reimbursement from the parent, the 
same as any other debt. The State of Utah should proceed in an 
action to collect a debt, rather than intervene in a divorce 
proceeding as it has done in this case. 
The Elizabethian Poor Laws were enacted in England in 
the very early Seventeenth Century, which gave an individual the 
right to reimbursement for payments furnished to another person's 
wife and/or children. The right granted to the individual who 
furnished the necessities to a wife and/or family when the husband 
failed to. provide for them was an action at law independent of 
any other action. 
There has been no right at common law to enter into a 
divorce proceeding between the parties, but there was an action 
separate and apart from the divorce proceedings to collect the 
moneys expended by an individual who paid the necessities of the 
needy wife and/or family. 
The State should proceed in an action separate from the 
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present divorce proceeding to collect the moneys which it claims 
the Respondent owes to the State: 
POINT II 
AN ORDER MUST ISSUE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT BEFORE THE 
STATE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
The direct issue before the Court is whether the State 
is entitled to leimbursement for public assistance moneys rendered 
to a wife and her child without a Court determination, a Court 
order, or an administrative proceeding. 
The State in this matter contends that a husband must 
reimburse the State for all moneys that it paid in public 
assistance payments to a wife and/or child, whether or not the 
husband can afford to make such payments to the State; and before 
a husband has ever been afforded his due process rights to a notice 
and hearing. Such a holding would mean that any amount that the 
State has paid to a person's spouse and family must be paid back 
to the State without any determination as to whether or not the 
spouse should be held accountable for such sums. 
Such a holding would not facilitate equity in any 
proceeding against the husband in such circumstances. In the 
case of San Bernardino County v. McCall, 132 P.2d 65, 56 C.A. 
2d 99 (1973), in a proceeding whereby the County attempted 
to compel the defendant to reimburse the County for aid 
which the County had furnished to the defendant's parents 
and for an order further requiring the defendant to 
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contribute to the support of his parents in the future, the Court 
held that it was the body to determine what amounts, if any, the 
State would be reimbursed for the aid which it had given. The 
County in that action had a statutory scale set up for guidance 
set by the Board of Supervisors in fixing liability of responsible 
relatives. The Court determined that the amount of liability of 
a person was a question of fact for the trial court to determine 
rather than having a set fee established with no variances what-
soever. The Court further held in that case where the individual 
did not have the ability to contribute to his parents' support, 
that individual did not have to reimburse the State for moneys 
which it expended in the support of his parents. 
The Respondent in this matter has very minimal resources, 
as was noted to the Trial Court and the other counsel in this action. 
The defendant has either had low-paying jobs or has been without 
work for extended periods of time throughout the past few years. 
The State in this matter has attempted to set mandatory 
reimbursement requirements upon the defendant, as was also 
attempted in San Bernardino County v. McCall, supra, without any 
consideration as to defendant's ability to pay support payments. 
The Trial Court, as the determiner of fact in such proceedings as 
this, determines what amounts were due to the State in this action. 
The Court in this matter was made aware of the status and situation 
of the Respondent before it made its determination as to the amount 
of responsibility of the Respondent. Being cognizant of these 
facts, the Court acted correctly in making its award to the State 
and the Court did not act arbitrarily in its decision. 
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A husband has the duty to support his wife and child as 
defined in 78-45-3, Utah Code Annotated. However, the District 
Court has jurisdiction of all proceedings under the Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, which is contained in 78-45-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, et seq. Though there is a duty of support, no 
amount may be due or owing to be reimbursed to any individual for 
another party until an order is issued by the Court, 
The Court determines what amount is to be paid as support 
by considering the factors enumerated in 78-45-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, plus any other relevant factors that the Court deems 
necessary. After such a determination an order is issued by the 
Court for the obligor to pay the support owing. The State of 
Utah in this case is attempting to obviate any court action and 
have all the moneys which it dispenses to a mother and her child 
as moneys which the husband must reimburse to the State. Such an 
action is inconsistent with the statutory language in 78-45-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, et seq. and 78-45b-l, et seq. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45-1 through 8, places all of 
the responsibilities as to support in the hands of the District 
Court for its determination. 78-45-9, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides that the obligee may enforce his right under Chapter 45b 
of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, but upon reading that section 
which pertains directly with the support of children, it is easily 
determined that an order must issue from the District Court as to 
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what amounts the obligor must pay. 78-45b-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
reads in part as follows: 
". . .department may issue a notice of a support 
debt accrued or accruing based upon any court 
order." 
Under that provision the Court order must first have 
been issued before the State can attempt reimbursement. Even 
when examining 78-45b-5, Utah Code Annotated, which states: 
"In the absence of a court order, the director 
may issue notice of a support debt accrued or 
accruing based upon furnishing of support by the 
department for the benefit of any dependent child." 
no ability is given to the director to assess what amounts an 
individual owes, just that moneys are being expended on that 
individual's behalf. 
The director, in such a circumstance, may give notice that 
a debt is accruing. However, it is the Trial Court that determines 
what amount of reimbursement the State shall be entitled to. No-
where in any of these sections does it state that an individual is 
to pay the State for all moneys the State spends. Total 
reimbursement to the State by one who is a pauper works an injustice 
upon that individual who has no ability to even furnish the 
lecessities of life to himself, much less to any one else. 
The State would have this Court hold that when it serves 
notice to an individual that public assistance payments are being 
a^aae for ardon behalf of that individual, that that individual 
vouid then become liable for all moneys expended by the State. 
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In the case of Mallett v. Luihn, 294 P. 2d 871, 206 Or. 
678 (1956), a case involving an action by the Welfare Commission 
against a relative of the needy person, whereby the Commission 
sought to recover its moneys which it had expended to provide for 
the needy relative in that case, the Court stated that after notice 
is sent to an individual to add to his responsibility to care for 
a needy relative, that individual denies liability, and a hearing 
is set by the Commission, the Commission after determining 
liability of the individual of the needy relative, that individual 
may then apply to the District Court for a trial court determination 
as to what moneys it is responsible to the Commission for its support 
of the needy relative. 
In the case before the Court, the defendant was notified 
in late August, 1975, that the State was making pyblic assistance 
payments to the estranged wife of the defendant. After such 
notification the defendant denied any liability to the State for 
the payments which it had made to defendant's wife. The State 
then set the hearing before the Third District Court by bringing 
an order to show cause in re temporary support for and in behalf 
of the plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves. 
As in the Oregon case, a determination was made on the 
merits by the Judge, after which the Judge awarded the State $495.00 
less previous payments made by the defendant. The Court further 
ordered that the defendant pay $50.00 per month as child support. 
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Such acts of the Court were within its discretion. The Court had 
jurisdiction in this matter which the State had placed itself under 
when it brought the action for the temporary support payments and 
its motion for payments to reimburse the State for the public 
assistance payments made to the plaintiff. 
Appellant, in its brief, cites Los Angeles County v. 
Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526, 19 Cah 634 (1942) as standing for the 
proposition that there is no need to go into Court for reimburse-
ment based on the statute. In the above cited case the County was 
seeking reimbursement from a relative of a pauper to whom the 
County had furnished aid. The Court in interpreting the Welfare 
and Institutions Code of California, noted that reimbursement was 
to be accomplished in one of two ways — both of which dictated 
that the County bring an action in Court after which the Court, not 
the County, would determine the amount of liability of the indigent's 
relatives. The Court was to determine liability and financial 
ability in the proceedings brought by the Court. 
The California Code gave the County the right to proceed 
against the indigent's relative in one section and the jurisdiction 
of the Court in another. The Utah Code gives the State the right 
to proceed against the non-supporting party in one section and 
gives the Court jurisdiction in another in a similar concept as 
the California Code. The County, in Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 
supra, attempted to have the Court grant it judgment for all 
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moneys it had given to the indigent in that case against the 
relative, but the Court stated that when it was given jurisdiction 
by statute, as the Utah Court is given, it is the body to 
determine what the liability is of the relative, and not the 
County. 
In the action before this Court, the Appellant would 
have the State Department of Social Services determine the amount 
of liability of an individual regardless of any Court order or 
administrative procedure or of the individual's financial ability. 
In Family Law by C. Clinton Clod, Harry W. Halstead and Donald W. 
Crocker (1964), American Law Institute, 3rd Ed., it states that 
an action for support between a husband and wife ". . .could be 
brought in any Civil Court", at 109. As noted in that text, an 
action for support is an in persona action or sometimes, in rem. 
Nowhere in the text does it suggest that the action is solely an 
administrative determination without a hearing as the Appellant 
would ask this Court to so hold. 
Two other points are made by the authors of Family Law: 
(1) The obligation to support may be enforced in favor of a spouse 
in any Court and state that has jurisdiction over the defendant, 
which is also established in 78-45-6, Utah Code Annotated; and 
(2) It is up to the Court to fix the amount of support. 
The State in this matter would seek to circumvent both of 
the established requirements. The State, after paying public 
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assistance is attempting to declare such payments as a judgment, 
rather than a debt, and then ask the Court to enforce its judgment, 
rather than have the Court fix the amount of support. Such is not 
the law in this State. The statutory language of Utah Code 
Annotated, 78-45-7, as previously noted, gives the Court the 
ability to determine what amounts are due or should be paid by 
a husband to support his wife and children. Even the treatise of 
William J. Brockbank and Felix Infausto, Interstate Enforcement of 
Family Support (the Runaway Pappy Act), 2nd Ed., notes that there 
is a duty to support one's spouse but that the amount of obligation 
arises only upon litigation. (Id. pages 32-42) 
The Respondent does not deny that there is a duty to 
support one's wife and children. Such a duty was first established 
by the Elizabethian Poor Laws and in this State by statute. 
However, a person or party who furnishes support to a husband's wife 
and children must bring an action at law or in equity to seek 
reimbursement and only after the Court has been presented with the 
facts before it can the Court then issue an order for reimbursement 
and/or future obligations. The District Court, after being 
presented with a question of a debt for which the state was 
seeKing reimbursement, determined what amount the defendant was 
to reimburse the State. Such a determination was not an arbitrary 
or capricious determination, but one determined on a reasonable 
basis. 
78-45-1 and 78-45b-l, Utah Code Annotated, et seq, set 
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two separate and distinct standards — one which directly applies 
to a wife and child, and the latter section directly with child 
support. The District Court noted the distinction in the proceed-
ings brought by the State and after due deliberation and testimony 
awarded the State the moneys for which it should be reimbursed. 
The Trial Court acted reasonably in determining what 
amounts the State was entitled to, The Trial Court further acted 
properly in determining that it was the trier in the case and not 
the Utah State Department of Social Services; and that as the 
trier, only after it had made its determination and decree would 
the defendant be liable for support of his wife and alleged child. 
Only after an order has issued from the District Court who has 
determined the liability of a father in such a case is the State 
entitled to reimbursement of payment which it has made to a 
husband's wife and children. The District Court properly made such 
a determination in this matter and denied the State the relief 
sought. 
Notice and hearing are due process requirements which must 
be met by this State before it can impose any obligation upon the 
defendant in this matter. The State chose to proceed before the 
District Court, who did impose certain liabilities and responsibili-
ties upon the defendant. The obligations which the District Court 
imposed were proper under the circumstances. 
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POINT III 
A HUSBAND WITH MEAGER MEANS OF SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE 
REQUIRED TO EXPEND ALL OF HIS RESOURCES SUPPORTING OTHERS. 
The Respondent was receiving approximately a gross 
income of $300.00 per month (T.2) at the time of the hearing. 
The Respondent has had no training nor skill in any trade or 
profession and is in a low employability classification (T.2). 
He is very often unemployed because of his lack of skill and 
training and at the present time he is unemployed, having been 
dismissed from his past job. Nonethelessr the State would ask 
that this individual reimburse the State for the public assistance 
payments which it has paid to his wife and alleged child, when the 
Respondent is hardly in any position to meet the temporary support 
payments ordered by the District Court, as well as his own monthly 
expenses. To saddle a person with an obligation that is minimal 
to many people but to the Respondent, whose means are very minimal, 
is too great a burden. 
In Family Law, Id., which was published in 1964, the 
authors noted that a household that was existing on $3 50.00 per 
month under one roof would need not less than $450.00 to $475.00 
per month when living apart. The authors1 solution in the matter 
was for the wife to get a job, otherwise the State would have a 
husband on welfare as well as the wife. 
The statute 7 8-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, states that the 
Court must determine what amount should be paid an individual as 
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support. The Court uses equity to make its determination and 
equity should be used in the present case. In Selected Problems 
in Family Law and Poverty, 2nd Ed. (1973) by Conrad Poison, the 
author states that: 
"The assumption of both our welfare law and 
alimony law that upon marriage a husband is saddled 
with a life-long duty to support a wife or exwife 
who does not remarry is most questionable in any age 
when women clamored for more and achieved equality. 
The present assumption makes women more equal than 
equal. Even if the husband's obligations conditioned 
upon the actual need and ability to pay, the assumed 
obligation is questionable. It is an instant of 
status, rather than a contract." At 4 43. 
The author further notes. 
"In the case of the more prosperous, the 
husband's duty to support or to pay alimony may be 
an unpleasant but tolerable burden, but where a poor 
or low-income husband, even a minimal offer may 
constitute a great hardship or impossible burden. 
. . . Often forced the man into defiance of the law 
to prevent him from living in dignity." At 443. 
The Respondent is without means to reimburse the State 
and to force him in such a situation would create a great hardship 
upon him. The Court has stated that what it attempts to do in a 
divorce proceeding is to set the parties in a position where they 
can start again, in a fresh and new beginning, ". . .So that the 
parties can reconstruct their lives in the most happy and useful 
manner". Cox v. Cox (Utah, 1975) 532 P.2d 994. 
To place the burden which the State is attempting to put 
upon the Respondent would prevent him from starting a fresh, new 
life. Equity would dictate that he should not be saddled with 
such a burden in his present situation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Respondent is an individual of minimal resources. 
The State should not be allowed to compoetely exhaust what small 
amounts of income this Respondent has by allowing an "automatic" 
judgment against the Respondent for funds expended by the State 
in payments to the Respondent's wife and alleged child. Clearly 
this is not the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statutes. 
The State of Utah should proceed in an action at law 
to collect what monies it may be entitled to for its expenditures 
to the Respondent's estranged wife and alleged child. The State 
should be precluded from entering into the divorce action of the 
parties and the State should only be awarded judgment or be 
entitled to any monies only by order and award of the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
